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ABSTRACT
In recent years, fuzz testing has proven itself to be one of the most
effective techniques for finding correctness bugs and security vul-
nerabilities in practice. One particular fuzz testing tool, American
Fuzzy Lop or AFL, has become popular thanks to its ease-of-use
and bug-finding power. However, AFL remains limited in the depth
of program coverage it achieves, in particular because it does not
consider which parts of program inputs should not be mutated in
order to maintain deep program coverage. We propose an approach,
FairFuzz, that helps alleviate this limitation in two key steps. First,
FairFuzz automatically prioritizes inputs exercising rare parts of
the program under test. Second, it automatically adjusts the muta-
tion of inputs so that the mutated inputs are more likely to exercise
these same rare parts of the program. We conduct evaluation on
real-world programs against state-of-the-art versions of AFL, thor-
oughly repeating experiments to get good measures of variability.
We find that on certain benchmarks FairFuzz shows significant
coverage increases after 24 hours compared to state-of-the-art ver-
sions of AFL, while on others it achieves high program coverage at
a significantly faster rate.
1 INTRODUCTION
Fuzz testing has emerged as one of the most effective testing tech-
niques for finding correctness bugs and security vulnerabilities in
real-world software systems. It has been used successfully by major
software companies such as Microsoft [16] and Google [5, 13, 33]
for security testing and quality assurance. The term fuzz testing
is generally used to designate techniques which test programs by
generating random input data and executing the program under
such inputs. The goal of fuzz testing is to exercise as many program
paths as possible with the hope of catching bugs that surface as
assertion violations or program crashes. While many individual
test inputs generated by fuzz testing may be garbage, due to its low
computational overhead, fuzz testing can generate test inputs much
faster than more sophisticated methods such as dynamic symbolic
execution [11, 17, 37, 38]. In practice, this trade-off has paid off, and
fuzz testers have found numerous correctness bugs and security vul-
nerabilities in widely used software [9, 14, 25, 26, 28, 34, 39, 41, 43].
The success of one particular fuzz tester, American Fuzzy Lop
(or simply AFL) [43], has gained attention both in practice and
in the research community [8, 9, 30, 39]. This fuzz tester alone
has found vulnerabilities in a broad array of programs, including
Web browsers (e.g. Firefox, Internet Explorer), network tools (e.g.,
tcpdump, wireshark), image processors (e.g., ImageMagick, libtiff),
© 2017 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
This is the author’s version of the work. It is posted here for your personal use. Not
for redistribution.
various system libraries (e.g., OpenSSH, PCRE), C compilers (e.g.,
GCC, LLVM), and interpreters (for Perl, PHP, JavaScript). A large
part of its popularity can be attributed to its easy setup. To use it,
one needs only to compile it from source, compile the program of
interest with AFL’s instrumented version of gcc or clang, collect
a sample input, and run AFL.
Matching the simplicity of its setup is the simplicity of its pro-
cess. At its base, all AFL does is mutate the user-provided inputs
with byte-level operations. It runs the program under test on the
mutated inputs and collects some low-overhead program coverage
information from these runs. Then it saves the interesting mutated
inputs—the ones that discover new program coverage. Finally, it
continually repeats the process, starting with these interesting mu-
tated inputs instead of the user-provided ones.
While playing with AFL and its extensions, we observed—as oth-
ers have in the past [1, 9, 30, 39] — one important limitation of AFL:
AFL often fails to explore programs very deeply, i.e. into sections
guarded by specific constraints on the input. This is partly because
AFL does not take into consideration which parts of the input may
be necessary for deeper program exploration. For example, consider
a program processing an image format. This format may have a
particular header indicating its validity, and perhaps some special
byte sequences which trigger different parts of the image processor.
In order to cover deeper program functionality, an input must have
this specific header and some of these special byte sequences. But
even if AFL finds inputs with this header or these sequences, it has
no knowledge that the parts of the inputs containing them are im-
portant for deep exploration of the program. Therefore, it is just as
likely to mutate the header and special sequences as it is to mutate
the data portion of the image. A bug which only manifests when
the header and sequences are in place may take a much longer time
to be generated than it would if these important parts of the input
were kept fixed.
We propose an approach, called FairFuzz, that tries to alleviate
this limitation. FairFuzz functions in two main steps. First, it au-
tomatically prioritizes inputs exercising rare parts of the program
under test. Second, it automatically adjusts byte-level mutation
techniques to increase the probability that mutated inputs will ex-
ercise these same rare parts of the program while still exploring
different paths through the program. While we propose this muta-
tion modification strategy with the target of exercising rare parts
of the program, it could be adapted to target other interesting parts
of the program, e.g., a recently patched function.
We created an open-source implementation of FairFuzz on top
of AFL. We evaluated FairFuzz against three popular versions of
AFL: AFL, FidgetyAFL [44]) (a modification of AFL to better match
the behavior of AFLFast [9]), and AFLFast.new [7] (an enhancement
of AFLFast to match the behavior of FidgetyAFL).
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We evaluated our approach on four general fronts. First, whether
it would result in faster program coverage. Relatedly, whether it
would result in more extensive coverage after a standard time bud-
get (24 hours). Third, whether the modification of AFL’s mutation
technique results in a higher proportion of inputs exercising the tar-
geted parts of the program. Finally, whether it would enhance AFL’s
crash-finding ability. We conduct our evaluation on nine real-world
benchmarks, including those used to evaluate AFLFast. We repeat
our experiments and provide measures of variability when com-
paring techniques. We find that on certain benchmarks FairFuzz
leads to significant coverage increases after 24 hours compared to
AFL, FidgetyAFL, and AFLFast.new, and that on other benchmarks
FairFuzz achieves wide program coverage at a significantly faster
rate. We also observed that FairFuzz tends to perform better on
programs with many nested conditionals.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We propose an approach to increase the coverage obtained
by greybox fuzzers by targeting rare branches, including
a more general method to target mutations to a program
characteristic of interest.
• We develop an open-source1 implementation of this ap-
proach built on top of AFL, named FairFuzz.
• We perform evaluation of FairFuzz against different state-
of-the-art versions of AFL on real-world benchmarks with
numerical information presented with a measure of variabil-
ity (i.e. confidence intervals).
• When comparing state-of-the-art versions of AFL, we repeat
our experiments 20 times to obtain statistically significant
results and to measure variability in the outcomes. We show
that repetition and variability measures are necessary to
draw correct conclusions while comparing AFL-based tech-
niques due to the highly non-deterministic nature of AFL.
To our knowledge, we are the first work on AFL-based tech-
niques to report a measure of variability in the coverage the
techniques achieve through time.
We detail the general method and implementation on top of
AFL in Section 3 and the performance results in Section 4. We will
begin in Section 2 with a more detailed overview of AFL, its current
limitations, and how to overcome these with our method.
2 OVERVIEW
Our proposed technique, FairFuzz, is built on American Fuzzy
Lop (AFL) [43]. AFL is a popular greybox mutation-based fuzz
tester. 2 Next we give a brief description of AFL, illustrate one of
its limitations, and motivate the need for FairFuzz.
To fuzz test programs, AFL generates random inputs. However,
instead of generating these inputs blindly, from scratch, it selects a
set of previously generated inputs and mutates them to derive new
random inputs. A key innovation behind AFL is its use of coverage
information collected during the execution of the program on its
previously-generated inputs. Specifically, AFL uses this information
to select inputs formutation, selecting only those that have achieved
1https://github.com/carolemieux/afl-rb
2Greybox fuzz testers [3, 43] are designated as such since, unlike whitebox fuzz
testers [11, 16, 17, 37], they do not do any source code analysis, but, unlike pure
blackbox fuzz testers [25], they use limited feedback from the program under test to
guide their fuzzing strategy.
new program coverage. In order to collect this coverage information
efficiently, AFL inserts instrumentation into the program under test.
To track coverage, it first associates each basic block with a random
number via instrumentation. The random number is treated as the
unique ID of the basic block. The basic block IDs are then used
to generate unique IDs for the transitions between pairs of basic
blocks. In particular, for a transition from basic block A to B, AFL
uses the IDs of each basic block—ID(A) and ID(B), respectively—to
define the ID of the transition, ID(A→ B), as follows:
ID(A→ B) = (ID(A) ≫ 1) ⊕ ID(B).
Right-shifting (≫) the basic block ID of the transition start block
(A) ensures that the transition from A to B has a different ID from
the transition from B to A. We associate the notion of basic block
transition with that of a branch in the program’s control flow graph,
and throughout the paper we will use the term branch to refer
to this AFL-defined basic block transition unless stated otherwise.
Note that since random numbers are used as unique IDs for basic
blocks, there is a small but non-zero probability of having the same
ID for two different branches. However, AFL’s creator argues [46]
that for many programs the actual branch ID collision rate is small.
The coverage of the program under test on a given input is
collected as a set of pairs of the form (branch ID, hit count). If a
(branch ID, hit count) pair is present in the coverage set, it denotes
that during the execution of the program on the input, the branch
with ID branch ID was exercised hit count number of times. The hit
count is bucketized to small powers of two. AFL refers this set of
pairs as the path of an input. AFL says that an input achieves new
coverage if it hits a new branch (one not exercised in any previous
execution) or achieves a new hit count for an already-exercised
branch—i.e. if it discovers a new (branch ID, hit count) pair.
The overall AFL fuzzing algorithm is given in Algorithm 1. The
fuzzing routine takes as input a program and a set of user-provided
seed inputs. The seed inputs are used to initialized a queue (Line 2)
of inputs. The queue contains the inputs which AFL will mutate
in order to generate new inputs. AFL goes through this queue
(Line 4), selects an input to mutate (Line 5), mutates the input
(Lines 9, 14), runs the program on and, simultaneously, collects
the coverage information for the mutated inputs (Line 21), and
finally adds these mutated inputs to the queue if they achieve new
coverage (Line 23). An entire pass through the queue is called a
cycle; cycles are repeated (Line 3) until the fuzz testing procedure
is stopped by the user.
AFL’s mutation strategies assume the input to the program un-
der test is a sequence of bytes, and can be treated as such during
mutation. AFL mutates inputs under two main stages: the determin-
istic (Algorithm 1, Lines 8-11) stages and the havoc (Lines 12-16)
stage. All the deterministic mutation stages operate by traversing
the input under mutation and applying a mutation at sequential
positions (bits and bytes) in this input. These mutations includes bit
flipping, byte flipping, arithmetic increment and decrement of byte
values, replacing of bytes with “interesting” values, etc. The num-
ber of mutated inputs produced in each of these stages is governed
by the length of the input being mutated. On the other hand, the
havoc stage works by applying a sequence of random mutations
(e.g. setting random bytes to random values, deleting or cloning sub-
sequences of the input) to the input being mutated to produce a new
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Algorithm 1 AFL Fuzzing
1: procedure FuzzTest(Proд, Seeds)
2: Queue ← Seeds
3: while true do ▷ begin a queue cycle
4: for seed in Queue do
5: if ¬isWorthFuzzing(seed) then
6: continue
7: end if
8: for i in 0 to length(seed) do
9: newinput ←mutateDeterministic(seed , i)
10: runAndMaybeSave(Proд,newinput ,Queue)
11: end for
12: score ←performanceScore(Proд, seed)
13: for i in 0 to score do
14: newinput ←mutateHavoc(seed)
15: runAndMaybeSave(Proд,newinput ,Queue)
16: end for
17: end for
18: end while
19: end procedure
20: procedure runAndMaybeSave(Proд, input ,Queue)
21: runResults ← run(Proд, input )
22: if newCoverage(runResults) then
23: addToQueue(input ,Queue)
24: end if
25: end procedure
input. The number of total havoc-mutated inputs to be produced is
determined by a performance score, score (Line 12).
AFL’s mutation strategies pay little or no attention to the con-
tents of an input. Therefore, they can easily destroy parts of an
existing input that are necessary to explore deeper parts of a pro-
gram. To see how this could make it difficult for AFL to explore
deeper parts of the program under test, consider the code in Fig-
ure 1. This fragment, simplified from a portion of the libxml file
parser.c, shows the various nested string comparisons that pro-
cess XML default declarations. Exploring the correct handling of,
say, the requirement that the #FIXED keyword must be followed by
a blank character (Line 16) requires producing an input containing
the string <!ATTLIST, followed by a correct attribute type string like
ID or CDATA (to pass Line 3), then finally the string #FIXED. If AFL
manages to produces the input <!ATTLIST BD, it will not prioritize
mutation of the bytes after <!ATTLIST, and is as likely to produce
the mutants <!CATLIST BD, <!!ATTLIST BD, ???!ATTLIST BD as
it is to produce <!ATTLIST ID.3 However, to explore the code in
Figure 1 more rapidly, once <!ATTLIST BD has been discovered,
mutations should keep the <!ATTLIST part of this input constant.
We propose a two-pronged approach that builds on AFL to do
exactly this. The first part of our approach is the identification of
statements like the if statements in Figure 1 (and Line 3 of Figure 2).
For this, we leverage the fact that such statements are indeed hit by
very few of AFL’s generated inputs (i.e. they are rare), and can thus
3AFL does perform some more complex mutations only on positions which, when
mutated, cause different program behavior. In this case, <!CATLIST BD, <!!ATTLIST
BD, and ???!ATTLIST BD are generated by mutations performed at locations whose
modification results in different behavior.
1 if (CMP9(ptr ,'<','!','A','T','T','L','I','S','T')) {
2 // if an attribute type is found , process default val
3 if (xmlParseAttributeType(ptr) > 0) {
4 if (CMP9(ptr ,'#','R','E','Q','U','I','R','E','D')) {
5 ptr += 9;
6 default_decl = XML_ATTRIBUTE_REQUIRED;
7 }
8 if (CMP8(ptr ,'#','I','M','P','L','I','E','D')) {
9 ptr += 8;
10 default_decl = XML_ATTRIBUTE_IMPLIED;
11 }
12 if (CMP6(ptr ,'#','F','I','X','E','D')) {
13 ptr += 6;
14 default_decl = XML_ATTRIBUTE_FIXED;
15 if (! IS_BLANK_CH(ptr)) {
16 xmlFatalErrorMsg("Space required after '#FIXED'");
17 }
18 }
19 }
20 }
Figure 1: Code fragment based off the libxml file parser.c
showing many nested if statements that must be satisfied to
explore erroneous behavior.
be easily identified by keeping the track of the number of inputs
which hit each branch. Having identified these rare branches for
targeted fuzzing, we modify the input mutation strategy in order
to keep the condition of the rare branch satisfied. Specifically, we
use a deterministic mutation phase to approximately determine the
parts of the input that cannot be mutated if we want the input to
hit the rare branch. The subsequent mutation stages are then not
allowed to mutate these crucial parts of the input. As a result, we
significantly increase the probability of generating new inputs that
hit the rare branch. This opens up the possibility of better exploring
the part of the code that is guarded by the if condition. We find
this approach leads to significant coverage increases after 24 hours
compared to stock AFL and other modified versions of AFL on
some benchmarks, and that on other benchmarks it achieves wide
program coverage at a significantly faster rate. We will present the
details of this approach in the next section.
We note that prior work on AFL has focused on a closely related,
but not identical, issue. This issue is usually illustrated with code
fragments like that in Figure 2. In this fragment, a program crash
hides behind a branch statement that is only satisfied by the pres-
ence of a certain magic number in the input: AFL’s mutation-based
strategy is highly unlikely to discover the 8 consecutive magic bytes.
Several techniques have been proposed to allow AFL to better ex-
plore scenarios like these. AFLFast [9] assumes these will present
as rare paths and applies more havoc mutations on seeds exercising
rare paths to try and hit more rare paths; Driller [39] uses sym-
bolic execution to produce these magic numbers when AFL gets
stuck; Steelix [30] adds a static analysis stage, extra instrumenta-
tion, and mutations to AFL to exhaustively search the bytes around
a byte which is matched in a multi-byte comparison. The issue of
producing a single input with a magic number is fundamentally
orthogonal to the issue of making sure this magic number retains its
value. None of these techniques will be able to prevent this magic
number from being mutated during AFL’s usual mutation stages
after it has been discovered, while our technique does. Additionally,
since Steelix does not instrument one byte comparison instructions,
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1 int main( int argc , const char* argv[] ) {
2 // ...
3 if (magic == 0xBAAAAAAD) {
4 // crash!
5 }
6 }
Figure 2: Magic number guarding a crash.
it would not effectively explore the code in Figure 1, as the CMPn
macros compile into single byte comparison instructions. Since
AFLFast’s emphasis on rare paths is similar to our emphasis on rare
branches, we will evaluate our technique against AFLFast.
3 FAIRFUZZ ALGORITHM
In FairFuzz4, we modify the AFL algorithm in two key ways to
target exploration to rare branches. First, we modify the selection
of inputs to mutate from the queue (isWorthFuzzing in Algo-
rithm 1, Line 5) in order to select inputs which hit rare branches.
Second, wemodify themutations that are performed on these inputs
(mutateDeterministic on Line 9 and mutateHavoc on Line 14)
in order to increase the probability that the mutated inputs will
hit the rare branch in question. We describe the modifications to
input selection in Section 3.1 and the modifications to the mutation
strategies in Section 3.2.
3.1 Selecting Inputs to Mutate
Recall from Section 2 that conventional AFL operates by repeatedly
traversing a queue of inputs and mutating these inputs to produce
new inputs. Unlike a traditional queue data structure, inputs are
never truly removed from the queue. Instead, the method isWorth-
Fuzzing selects certain inputs to mutate in each cycle. The method
is non-deterministic, prioritizing short, fast, and recently discovered
inputs, but sometimes selecting old inputs for mutation. We replace
isWorthFuzzing with the function hitsRareBranch, which, as
the name suggests, returns true if the input hits a rare branch and
false otherwise.
In order to do this, we must define what it means to be a rare
branch. A natural idea is to designate the n branches hit by the
fewest inputs as rare, or the branches hit by less than p percent of
inputs to be rare. After some initial experiments with our bench-
mark programs, we rejected these methods as (a) they can fail to
capture what it means to be rare (e.g. if n = 5 and the two rarest
branches are hit by 20 and 15,000 inputs, both would be equally rare
when this is clearly not the case), and (b) these thresholds would
likely need to be modified for different benchmarks.
Instead, we say a branch is rare if it has been hit by a number
of inputs less than or equal to a dynamically chosen rarity_cutoff.
Informally, rarity_cutoff is the smallest power of two which bounds
the number of inputs hitting the rarest branch. For example, if the
rarest branch has been hit by only 17 inputs, we would cut off rarity
at branches that have been hit by ≤ 25 inputs. Formally, if Bhit is
the set containing the number of inputs hitting each branch,
rarity_cutoff = 2i where 2i−1 < min(Bhit) ≤ 2i .
4FairFuzz is so called because it gives more priority to the rare branches of a program,
which are “unfairly” not prioritized by stock AFL.
FairFuzz keeps track of Bhit by keeping a map of branch IDs to
the number of inputs which hit the corresponding branch so far
(the input count). After running the program on an input, FairFuzz
increments the input count by one for each branch the input hits.
FairFuzz calculates rarity_cutoff at every call of hitsRareBranch.
During fuzzing, FairFuzz goes over the queue and selects for
mutation inputs on which hitsRareBranch returns true. Note that
the execution of a program on a selected input may hit multiple rare
branches. In that case, FairFuzz picks the rarest branch among them
as the target branch for the purpose of mutation, and subsequently
tries to make sure that mutations of the selected input hit this target
rare branch more frequently. Of course, if the input hits only one
rare branch, this is the target branch. Since at the beginning of fuzz
testing no inputs have been produced, and the definition of rare
requires some number of inputs to have hit a branch, we run a round
of regular AFL mutation on the user-provided input. All subsequent
inputs are selected from the queue with hitsRareBranch.
Finally, due to its strict boolean nature, hitsRareBranch can
get stuck more easily than the probabilistic isWorthFuzzing (i.e.
by repeatedly pulling the same input from the queue). Currently,
we take action only in the extreme case, when none of the mutated
inputs produced from a seed hit the target branch. If we witness
this behavior, we put the rare branch on an exclude list. We ignore
any branches in the exclude list when finding rare branches and
calculating the rare branch cutoff in the future.
3.2 Mutating Inputs
After selecting an input which hits a rare branch, we bias muta-
tion of this input to produce inputs which hit the target branch
at a higher frequency than AFL would. The biggest part of this
is the calculation of a branch mask, which we use to influence all
subsequent mutations.
The branch mask designates at which positions in the input can
bytes be (1) overwritten (overwritable), (2) deleted (deletable), or
(3) inserted (insertable) while the resulting input still hits the tar-
get branch. We compute this branch mask in AFL’s deterministic
mutation stages. Part (1) of the branch mask is computed in the
byte flipping stage: if the input resulting from a byte flip still hits
the target branch, the position is designated as overwritable. We
add two new deterministic stages after the byte flipping to com-
pute parts (2) and (3) of the mask. First, we traverse the input and
delete each byte in sequence, marking the position as deletable
if its removal does not make the program miss the target branch.
Similarly, we traverse the input and add a random byte before each
position (and at the end of the input), marking the position as in-
sertable if the resulting input still makes the program hit the target
branch. Note that this technique for computing the branch mask is
approximate—even if FairFuzz determines that a position in the
input is overwritable, a particular mutation of the byte at that posi-
tion might make the program miss the target branch, or vice-versa.
However, in our experiments we found that the use of branch mask
significantly increases the probability of hitting the target branch
(see Section 4.2).
After its calculation, the branch mask is used to influence all
subsequent mutations of the input. During the deterministic stages,
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a mutation is performed at a position only if the branch mask in-
dicates the target branch can still be hit by the resulting input. In
the havoc stage, instead of performing random mutations at ran-
domly selected positions in the input, FairFuzz performs random
mutations at positions randomly selected within the corresponding
modifiable positions of the branch mask. Note that when, during
havoc mutations, bytes are deleted from or added to the mutated
input, the branch mask created for the input at the beginning of
the mutation process no longer maps to the input being mutated.
As such, FairFuzz modifies the branch mask in coordination with
the mutated input. When a block of the input is deleted, FairFuzz
deletes the corresponding block within the branch mask; when a
block is inserted, FairFuzz inserts a section into the branch mask
which designates the new area as completely modifiable. Of course,
this is an approximation, so we expect the proportion of inputs
hitting the target branch in the havoc stage to be smaller than the
proportion of inputs hitting the rare branch in deterministic fuzzing
stages. We examine this further in Section 4.2.
3.3 Trimming Inputs for Target Branches
AFL’s efficiency depends on large part on its ability to quickly pro-
duce and modify inputs [46]. Thus, it is important to make sure
FairFuzz’s branch mask computation is efficient. Since the runtime
of the branch mask computation is linear in the length of the se-
lected input, FairFuzz needs to keep the length of the inputs in the
queue short. AFL has two techniques for keeping inputs short: (1)
prioritizing short inputs when selecting inputs for mutation and
(2) trimming (i.e. performing an efficient approximation of delta-
debugging [47]) the input it selects for mutation before mutating
it. Trimming attempts to minimize the input selected for mutation
with the constraint that the minimized input hits the same path
(set of (branch ID, hit count) pairs) as the seed input. However, this
constraint is not good enough for reducing the length of inputs sig-
nificantly when very long inputs are chosen—something FairFuzz
may do since it selects inputs only based on whether they hit a rare
branch. We found that we can make inputs shorter in spite of this
if we relax the trimming constraint to require that the minimized
input hits only the target branch of the original input, instead of
the same path as the original input. We refer to our technique with
this relaxed constraint as our technique “with trimming”.
4 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We have implemented our technique as an open-source extension
of AFL named FairFuzz. This implementation adds around 600
lines of C code to the file containing AFL’s core implementation,
including some code used only for experimentation, i.e. for the
statistics in Section 4.2.
In this evaluation we compare three popular versions of AFL
against FairFuzz, all based off of AFL version 2.40b. “AFL” is the
vanilla AFL available from AFL’s website. “FidgetyAFL” [44] is AFL
run without the deterministic mutation stage, which AFL’s creator
found replicated the performance of AFLFast [9] on some bench-
marks. “AFLFast.new” [7] is AFLFast run with new settings, which
has been claimed as significantly better than both FidgetyAFL and
AFLFast. AFLFast.new omits the deterministic stage and uses the
cut-off exponential exploration strategy. We ran FairFuzz with
input trimming for the target branch and omitting all deterministic
stages except those necessary for the creation of a branch mask.
Our initial experiments to determine which of our modifications
(trimming, using the branch mask, doing all deterministic muta-
tions) were most effective were inconclusive. This combination was
a compromise which saw coverage increases on multiple bench-
marks. We will refer to techniques (2), (3) and (4) as the “modified”
techniques.
To evaluate their ability to achieve fast code coverage and dis-
cover crashes, we evaluated the techniques on 9 different bench-
marks. We selected these from those favored for evaluation by
the AFL creator (djpeg from libjpeg-turbo-1.5.1, and readpng
from libpng-1.6.29), those used in AFLFast’s evaluation (tcpdump
-nr from tcpdump-4.9.0; and nm, objdump -d, readelf -a, and
c++filt from GNU binutils-2.28) and a few benchmarks with more
complex input grammars in which AFL has previously found vulner-
abilities (mutool draw from mupdf-1.9, and xmllint from libxml2-
2.94). Since some of these input formats had AFL dictionaries and
some did not, we ran all this evaluation without dictionaries to level
out the playing field. In each case we seeded the fuzzing run with
the inputs in the corresponding AFL testcases directories (except
c++filt, which was seeded with the input “_Z1fv\n”). We ran
each technique for 24 hours (on a single core) on each benchmark,
repeating each 24 hour run 20 times for each benchmark.
The main metric we report is basic block transitions covered,
which is close to the notion of branch coverage used in real-world
software testing. Due to AFL’s implementation, of the three com-
mon metrics used to evaluate versions of AFL—number of paths,
number of unique crashes, and number of basic block transitions
covered—this is the only one that is robust to the order in which
inputs are discovered. As a simple illustration, consider a program
with two branches, b1 and b2. Suppose inputA hits b1 once, input B
hits b2 once, and inputC hits both b1 and b2. Their respective paths
are pA = {(b1, 1)}, pB = {(b2, 1)}, and pC = {(b1, 1), (b2, 1)}. Now,
if AFL discovers these inputs in the order A,B,C it will save both A
and B and count 2 paths (or 2 unique crashes if both crash), and not
save C since it does not exercise a new (branch ID, hit count) pair.
On the other hand, if AFL discovers the inputs in the order C,A,B,
it will save C and count 1 path (or 1 unique crash if C crashes), and
save neither A nor B. Thus it appears on the second run that AFL
has found half the paths it did on the first run (or unique crashes).
On the other hand, regardless of the order in which inputs A,B,C
are discovered, the number of basic block transitions covered will
be 2. We note that the creator of AFL also favors basic block tran-
sitions covered over unique crashes as a performance metric [45].
We will nonetheless present data on AFL-measured unique crashes
in Section 4.3 for comparison to prior work.
Although previous work does not always repeat experiments [8,
30, 39] or, when the experiments repeated, provide any measure of
variability for metrics like unique crashes [9], we found compelling
evidence (see the results in Sections 4.1 and 4.3 and in particular the
graphs in Figure 3 and Figure 5) of the importance of reporting the
variability of AFL results in some form or another. We repeat our ex-
periments 20 times because AFL is an inherently non-deterministic
process (especially when running only havoc mutations), and so is
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(a) tcpdump (b) readelf (c) nm
(d) objdump (e) c++filt (f) xmllint
(g) mutool draw (h) djpeg (i) readpng
Figure 3: Number of basic block transitions (AFL branches) covered by different AFL techniques averaged over 20 runs (bands
represent 95% C.I.s).
its performance. This enabled us to report results that are statisti-
cally significant. We believe that all future research work should
perform experiments along similar lines.
4.1 Coverage Compared to Prior Techniques
In analyzing the program coverage achieved by each technique we
sought to answer two research questions:
RQ1 Does an emphasis on rare branches result in faster program
coverage?
RQ2 Does an emphasis on rare branches lead to long-term gains
in coverage?
To answer these questionwe begin by analyzing coverage asmea-
sured in the number of basic block transitions (branches) discovered
through time. Figure 3 plots, for each benchmark and technique, the
average number of branches covered over all 20 runs at each time
point (dark central line) and 95% confidence intervals in branches
covered at each time point (shaded region around line) over the 20
Higher is better
Figure 4: Number of benchmarks on which each technique
has the lead in coverage at each hour. A benchmark is
counted for multiple techniques if two techniques are tied
for the lead.
runs for each benchmark. For the confidence intervals we assume
a Student’s t Distribution (taking 2.0860 times the standard error).
We can see in this Figure 3 that on most benchmarks, FairFuzz
achieves the upper bound in branch coverage, generally showing
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the most rapid increase in coverage at the beginning of execution.
Overall, FairFuzz produces rapid increases in coverage compared
to other techniques on objdump, readelf, readpng, tcpdump, and
xmllint, and to a lesser degree on nm, while tying with the other
techniques on mutool and djpeg, and AFLFast.new having the edge
on c++filt. Note that while FairFuzz keeps a sizeable lead on the
xmllint benchmark (Figure 3f), it does so wide variability. Closer
analysis reveals that one run of FairFuzz on xmllint revealed a
bug in the rare branches queueing strategy, causing FairFuzz to
select no inputs for mutation—this run covered no more than 6160
branches. However, FairFuzz had two runs on xmllint covering an
exceptional 7969 and 10990 branches, respectively. But evenwithout
these three outliers, FairFuzz’s average coverage (6896) remains
much higher than the other techniques’ averages ( AFLFast.new
averages 6541 branches after 24 hours).
Figure 4, shows, at every hour, for how many benchmarks each
technique has the lead in coverage. By lead we mean its average
coverage is above the confidence intervals of the other techniques,
and no other technique’s average lies within its confidence interval.
We say two techniques are tied if one’s average lies within the
confidence interval of the other. If techniques tie for the lead, the
benchmark is counted for both techniques in Figure 4, which is
why the number of benchmarks at each hour may add up to more
than 9. This figure shows that FairFuzz quickly achieves a lead in
coverage on nearly all benchmarks and is not surpassed in coverage
by the other techniques in our time limits.
We believe Figures 3 and 4 are compelling evidence that in the
context of our benchmarks, the answer to our first research ques-
tion is yes, an emphasis on rare branches leads to faster program
coverage.
4.1.1 Detailed analysis of coverage differences. Figure 3 shows
there are three benchmarks (c++filt, tcpdump, and xmllint) on
which one technique achieves a lead in AFL’s branch coverage after
24 hours (with AFLFast.new leading on c++filt and FairFuzz on
the other two). So, to answer our second research question, we do
a more in depth analysis of the coverage achieved. In particular, we
examine what the difference in AFL branch coverage corresponds
to in terms of source code coverage.
Since AFL saves all inputs that achieve new program coverage
(i.e. that are placed in the queue) to disk, we can replicate what pro-
gram coverage was achieved in each run by replaying these queue
elements through the programs under test. Since each benchmark
was run 20 times, we take the union (over each technique) of inputs
in the queue for all 20 runs. We ran the union of the inputs for
each technique through their corresponding programs and then
ran lcov on the results to reveal coverage differences.
xmllint. The bulk of the coverage gains on xmllintwere in the
main parser.c file. The key trend in increased coverage appears to
be FairFuzz’s increased ability to discover keywords. For example,
both AFL and FairFuzz have higher coverage than FidgetyAFL
and AFLFast.new as they discovered the patterns <!DOCTYPE and
<!ATTLIST in at least one run. However, FairFuzz also discovered
the #REQUIRED, #IMPLIED, and #FIXED keywords, producing inputs
including:
<!DOCTYPE6[ <!ATTLISTí T ID #FIXED%
subsequence AFL FidgetyAFL AFLFast.new FairFuzz
<!A 7 15 18 17
<!AT 1 2 3 11
<!ATT 1 0 0 1
Table 1: Number of runs, for each technique, producing a
seed input with the given subsequence in 24 hours.
<!DOCTYPE|[ <!ATTLISTíD T ID #IMPLIEDOCTY
<!DOCTYPE\[ <!ATTLISTíD T ID #REQUIREDˆ@ˆP
We found several other instances of keywords discovered by Rare
Branches but not the other techniques for xmllint. We believe our
rare branch targeting technique is directly responsible for this. To
see this, let us focus on the <!ATTLIST> block covered by the inputs
above, whose code is outlined in in Figure 1. While both AFL and
FairFuzz had a run discovering the sequence <!ATTLIST, running
xmllint on all the saved inputs produced by AFL only resulted
in 18 hits of Line 2 of Figure 1. Running xmllint on all saved
inputs produced by FairFuzz, on the other hand, resulted in 2124
hits of this line. With the queued inputs resulting in two orders of
magnitude more hits of this line, it is obvious that FairFuzz was
better able to discover inputs with more structure than AFL.
It is valid to ask whether this increase is only attributable to luck,
since after all, it was only in one run that AFL and FairFuzz dis-
covered the full <!ATTLIST sequence. While we believe the believe
the difference in the number of inputs hitting Line 2 of Figure 1
for these two techniques is compelling evidence this was not the
case, looking at the number of runs which produced subsequences
of <!ATTLIST also seems to suggest it is not simply luck. As we
can see in Table 1, the decrease in the number of runs discovering
<!AT from the number of runs discovering <!A shows the branch
mask in action, with 11 of FairFuzz’ runs discovering <!AT, com-
pared to 1, 2, and 3 for AFLFast.new, FidgetyAFL, and AFLFast.new,
respectively.
We suspect FairFuzz performs particularly well on this bench-
mark due to the structure of the code in parser.c. The CMPnmacros
in this code (see Figure 1) expand into character-by-character string
comparisons. AFL is able to explore thesemore easily than full string
comparisons since this splits the comparison into different basic
blocks, progress through which is reported as new coverage. We dis-
cuss a recently proposed extension to the LLVM version of the AFL
instrumenter [1] that would automatically expand comparisons in
programs not structured in this manner in Section 5.
Finally, as is obvious from the example inputs above, although
FairFuzz discovered more keywords, the inputs it produced were
not necessarily more well-formed. Nonetheless, these inputs al-
lowed the FairFuzz to explore more of the program’s faults. This
is reflected in the coverage of a large case statement differentiating
57 error messages in parser.c. Both FidgetyAFL and AFLFast.new
cover only 22 of these cases, AFL covers 33, and FairFuzz covers 39.
Interestingly, FairFuzz misses one error that the other algorithms
cover—an error message about excessive name length—indicating
it did not produce an input with a long enough name to trigger
this error. We will come back to this when examining the coverage
differences in c++filt.
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tcpdump. We observed that coverage for tcpdump differs a bit
for all four techniques over a variety of different files. We see the
biggest gains in three files printing certain packet types, all of which
suggest FairFuzz is better able to automatically detect the structure
of inputs.
In print-forces.c, a ForCES Protocol printer (RFC 5810), all of
AFL, FidgetyAFL, and AFLFast.new are able to create files that pass
the first validity checks on message type, but only FairFuzz is able
to create files that have legal ForCES packet length. In print-llc.c,
an IEEE 802.2 Logical Link Control (LLC) parser, FairFuzz was
be able to create packets with the organizationally unique identi-
fier (OUI) corresponding to RFC 2684, and subsequently explore
the many subtypes of this OUI. Finally, in print-snmp.c, a Sim-
ple Network Management Protocol printer, we find that FairFuzz
produces inputs corresponding to Trap PDUs with valid times-
tamps while AFL does not. FairFuzz also produces scoped SNMP
PDUs with valid contextName while AFL does not. Finally, in a
function to decode a SNMPv3 user-based security message header
FairFuzz produces a few inputs which pass through this func-
tion successfully, while AFL does not produce any with a valid
msgAuthoritativeEngineBoots.
We note these gains in coverage seem less impressive than those
of FairFuzz on xmllint. We hypothesize this is because FairFuzz’s
performance on tcpdump may reflect consistently higher coverage
of the program, but most of this increase was matched in at least
one run of the other techniques. The coverage produced by run-
ning all inputs produced by each obscures on which proportion
of runs a certain packet structure was discovered. This hypothesis
is confirmed by comparing the number of branches covered by at
least one of the 20 runs (the union over the runs) and the number
of branches covered at least once in all the 20 runs (the intersection
over the runs) for the different techniques. For tcpdump, we see
FairFuzz has a much more consistent increase in coverage (the
intersection of coverage for FairFuzz contains 11,293 branches, 500
more branches than AFLFast.new’s 10,724), but no huge standout
gain the union (the union of coverage is 16,129, only 200 more
branches than AFLFast.new’s 15,929). FairFuzz’s performance on
xmllint shows the opposite behavior. The intersection of coverage
for xmllint is virtually the same for the three modified techniques
(5,876 for FidgetyAFL, 5,778 for AFLFast.new and 5,884 for Fair-
Fuzz), but FairFuzz’s union of coverage (11,681) contains over 4,000
more branches than AFLFast.new’s union of coverage (7,222).
c++filt. The differences in terms of source code coverage be-
tween techniques were much more minimal for c++filt than for
tcpdump or xmllint. We list all the differences in coverage be-
tween AFLFast.new and FairFuzz below. FairFuzz’s gains are
structural in the input type; it covers 3 lines in cp-demangle.c
that AFLFast.new does not, related to demangling binary com-
ponents when the operator has a certain opcode. AFLFast.new’s
gains appear to be mostly related to FairFuzz’s inability to produce
very long inputs. In cp-demangle.c, AFLFast.new covers a branch
where xmalloc_failed(INT_MAX) is called if a length bound com-
parison fails. FairFuzz fails to produce an input long enough to
violate the length bound. FairFuzz also fails to cover a branch
in cxxfilt.c, taken when the length of input read into c++filt
surpasses the length of the input buffer allocated to store it, which
all other techniques cover.
FairFuzz’s inability to produce very long inputs may be due to
the second round of trimming FairFuzz does. It could also be due
to the fact that a focus on branches, ignoring hit counts an input
achieves of a particular branch, may not encourage FairFuzz to
explore repeated iterations of loops. In spite of the fact that this
shows up as a small difference in measurable coverage, FairFuzz
shows very different behavior when it comes to finding crashes,
and we suspect the input length issue is a reason why. We will
discuss this in more detail in Section 4.3.
The pattern we see from this analysis is that FairFuzz is better
able to automatically discover input constraints and keywords—
special sequences, packet lengths, organization codes—and target
exploration to inputs which satisfy these constraints than the other
techniques. We suspect the gains in coverage speed on benchmarks
such as objdump, readpng, and readelf are due to similar factors.
We conjecture the targeting of rare branches shines the most in the
tcpdump and xmllint benchmarks since these programs are struc-
tured with many nested constraints, which the other techniques
are unable to properly explore over the time budget (and perhaps
even longer) without extreme luck.
4.2 Are branches successfully targeted?
Our third research question focused on the effectiveness of the
branch mask strategy, i.e.:
RQ3 Does the branch mask increase the proportion of produced
inputs hitting the target branch?
To evaluate this we conducted an experiment where, for each
seed input chosen for mutation we first ran a shadow run of muta-
tions with the branch mask disabled, then re-ran the mutations with
the branch mask enabled. We also disabled side effects (queueing
of inputs, incrementing of branch hit counts) in the shadow run.
This shadow run allows us to compute the difference between the
percentage of generated inputs hitting the branch with and without
the branch mask for each seed input.
We ran FairFuzzwith these shadow runs for one queueing cycle
on a subset of our benchmarks. For each benchmark we ran a cycle
with target branch trimming and one without. Table 2 shows the
target branch hit percentage for the deterministic5 and havoc stages,
averaging the per-input hit percentages over all inputs generated
in the first cycle.
Comparing the numbers in Table 2a and Table 2b, it appears
that trimming the input reduces the number of inputs hitting the
target branch when the branch mask is disabled but has minimal
effect when the branch mask is enabled. Overall, Table 2 shows
that the branch mask does largely increase the percentage of mu-
tated inputs hitting the target branch. The hit percentages for the
deterministic stage are strikingly high: this is not unexpected as in
the deterministic stage the branch mask simply operates to prevent
mutations at locations likely to violate the target branch. What is
most impressive is the gain in the percentage of inputs hitting the
target branch in the havoc stage. In spite of the use of the branch
5We separated the byteflipping stage in which the branch mask is computed— the
calibration stage—from the subsequent deterministic stages which use the branch
mask.
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Table 2: Average % of mutated inputs hitting target branch
for one queueing cycle.
(a) Cycle without trimming.
det. mask det plain havoc mask havoc plain
xmllint 92.8% 46.5% 31.8% 6.6%
tcpdump 99.0% 74.0% 34.2% 9.3%
c++filt 97.6% 64.1% 41.4% 14.4%
readelf 99.7% 82.7% 57.7% 14.9%
readpng 99.1% 34.6% 24.3% 2.4%
objdump 99.2% 70.2% 42.4% 9.0%
(b) Cycle with trimming.
det. mask det. plain havoc mask havoc plain
xmllint 90.3% 22.9% 32.8% 2.9%
tcpdump 98.7% 72.8% 36.1% 9.0%
c++filt 96.6% 14.8% 34.4% 1.1%
readelf 99.7% 78.2% 55.5% 11.4%
readpng 97.8% 39.0% 24.0% 2.4%
objdump 99.2% 66.7% 46.2% 7.6%
mask in the havoc stage being approximate, we consistently see the
use of the branch mask causing a 3x-10x increase in the percentage
of inputs hitting the target branch. From this analysis, we conclude
that the answer to our third research question is positive – the
branch mask increases the proportion of inputs hitting the target
branch.
Note that this branch mask targeting technique is independent of
the fact that the branches being targeted are “rare”. This means that
this strategy could be used in a more general context. For example,
we could target only the branches within a function that needs to
be tested, or, if some area of the code was recently modified or bug-
prone, we could target the branches in that area with the branch
mask. Recent work on targeted AFL [8] shows promise in such
an application of AFL, and we believe the branch mask technique
could be used cooperatively with the power schedules presented in
this work.
4.3 Crashing Compared to Prior Techniques
Our final research question pertains to crash finding:
RQ3. Does an emphasis on rare branches lead to faster crash ex-
posure?
Crash finding is hard to evaluate in practice. Of the 9 benchmarks
we tested on, all techniques found crashes only on c++filt and
readelf. While we discussed issues with the unique crashes metric
at the beginning of this section, for comparison with prior work, we
plot the unique crashes found by each technique in Figure 5. The
most interesting part of this figure is the width of the confidence
intervals, which reflects just how variable this metric is.
In spite of the variability, the figure suggests FairFuzz performs
poorly on c++filt in terms of crash exposure. To evaluate this,
we can first compare the percent of runs finding crashes for each
benchmark. On readelf, both AFL and FidgetyAFL find crashes in
50% of runs while AFLFast.new and FairFuzz find crashes in 75%
of runs. On c++filt, however, FidgetyAFL and AFLFast.new find
(a) readelf (b) cxxfilt
Figure 5: Average unique crashes found over 20 runs for each
technique (dark line) with 95% confidence intervals.
(a) readelf
(b) cxxfilt
Figure 6: Time to find first crash for each run of the different
techniques. Each point represents the time to first crash for
a single run.
crashes in 100% of the runs, AFL in 85% of them, and FairFuzz in
only 25%. Looking at the time to first crash for the different runs,
we see that for readelf, in general, FairFuzz finds crashes a bit
faster than AFLFast.new (Figure 6a). However, for the few runs on
which the FairFuzz found crashes for c++filt, it takes around 10
hours for FairFuzz to find the crashes as compared to less than 2
hours for FidgetyAFL.
Given that some of the lines missed by FairFuzz in c++filt
were about buffer length (recall Section 4.1.1), we suspected that
input length might be a factor in this performance discrepancy.
We examined the file size of the crashing inputs saved for each
technique. Many of these were very long, more than 20KB, with one
crashing input generated by AFLFast.new being 130KB long! We
saw crashing inputs of this length in only one of the five FairFuzz
runs which found crashes in c++filt.
Thus, we suspect a factor in FairFuzz’s poor performance on
crash finding on this c++filt is that themethod does not encourage
the creation of huge inputs. It is also possible that the structure of
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1 if ( str == "BAD!") {
2 // do bad things
3 }
1 if (str[0] == 'B') {
2 if (str[1] == 'A') {
3 if (str[2] == 'D') {
4 if (str[3] == '!') {
5 // do bad things
6 }}}}
Figure 7: Multi-byte comparison (left) unrolled to byte-by-
byte comparison (right).
c++filt may is better suited to a path-based exploration strategy
(like that of AFL/FidgetyAFL and AFLFast.new) than a branch-based
one. For example, demangling function argument types is done in
a loop, so FairFuzz is less likely to prioritize many new function
arguments than path-based prioritization does. Overall, the answer
to our final research question is that FairFuzz may improve crash
exposure in some cases (readelf), but does not when the crashes
are most easily exposed by large inputs.
5 DISCUSSION
The foremost limitation of FairFuzz is the fact that branches that
are never hit by any AFL input cannot be targeted by this method.
So, it confers little benefits to discovering a single long magic
number (like that in Figure 2) when progress towards matching
the magic number does not result in new coverage. However, re-
call FairFuzz was effective at finding keyword sequences in the
xmllint benchmark. This is because the long string comparisons in
parser.c were structured as byte-by-byte comparisons, so AFL’s
instrumentation reported new coverage when progress was made
on these comparisons. AFL’s instrumentation would not report new
coverage for progress on a single multi-byte comparison.
The creators of laf-intel [1] propose several LLVM “deopti-
mization” passes to improve AFL’s performance, including a pass
that automatically turns multi-byte comparisons into byte-by-byte
comparisons. Figure 7 shows an example of this comparison un-
rolling. The integration of these LLVM passes into AFL’s instrumen-
tation is straightforward, requiring only a patch to AFL’s LLVM-
based instrumenter [2]. Due to FairFuzz’s performance on the
xmllint benchmark, we believe FairFuzz could show similar cov-
erage gains on other programs if they were compiled with this
laf-intel pass. We did not evaluate this as the evaluation of the
laf-intel pass was done in AFL’s “parallel” fuzzing mode, with
some instances of AFL running on the traditionally instrumented
program and others running on the enhanced instrumentation pro-
grams. We did not do any experiments with this parallel fuzzing as
our implementation did not implement a distributed version of our
rare branch computation algorithm.
6 OTHER RELATEDWORK
Unlike FairFuzz and other greybox fuzzers [3] which use coverage
information as a heuristic for which inputs may yield new coverage
under mutation, symbolic execution tools [11, 17, 37, 38] methodi-
cally explore the program under test by capturing path constraints
and directly producing inputs which fit yet-unexplored path con-
straints. This cost of this precision is that it can lead to the path
explosion problem, which causes scalability issues.
Traditional blackbox fuzzers such as zzuf [25] mutate user-
provided seed inputs according to a mutation ratio, which may
need to be adjusted to the program under test. BFF [28] and Sym-
Fuzz [12] adapt this parameter automatically, by measuring crash
density (number of mutated inputs finding crashes) and doing input
bit dependence, respectively. These optimizations are not relevant
to AFL-type generational fuzzers which do not use this mutation
ratio parameter.
There exist several fuzzers highly optimized for certain input
file structures, including network protocols [4, 10], and source
code [26, 36, 41]. FairFuzz is of much lower specificity so will not be
as effective as these tools on these specific input formats. However,
its method is fully automatic, requiring neither user inputs [4] or
extensive tuning [36, 41].
While FairFuzz uses its branch mask to try and fix important
parts of program inputs, recent work has more explicitly tried to
automatically learn input formats. Learn&Fuzz [18] uses sequence-
based learning methods to learn the structure of pdf objects, lever-
aging this to produce new valid pdf. Autogram [27] proposes a
taint analysis- based approach to learning input grammars, while
Glade [6] uses an iterative approach and repeated calls to an oracle
to learn a context-free grammar for a set of inputs. We also do not
assume a corpus of valid inputs of any size from which validity
could be automatically learned in our work.
Another approach to smarter fuzzing is to find locations in seed
inputs related to likely crash locations in the program and focus mu-
tation there. BuzzFuzz [15] and TaintScope [40] pair taint analysis
with the detection of potential attack points (i.e. array allocations)
to find crashes more effectively. TaintScope also includes automated
checksum check detection. Dowser [21] has a similar goal but in-
stead guides symbolic execution down branches likely to find buffer
overflows. These directed methods are not directly comparable to
FairFuzz since they do not have the same goal of broadening and
deepening program exploration.
VUzzer’s [35] approach is reminiscent of these, using both static
and dynamic analysis to get immediate values used in comparisons
(likely to be magic numbers), positions in the input likely to be
magic numbers are offset, and information about which basic blocks
are hard to get to. It models the program as aMarkov Chain to decide
with parts of the program are rare, as opposed to our empirical
approach.
Randoop [34] automatically generates test cases for object ori-
ented programs through feedback-directed random test generation,
checking to make sure program fragments are valid; Evosuite [14]
uses seed inputs and genetic algorithms to achieve high code cov-
erage. Both these techniques focus on generating sequences of
method calls to test programs, which is quite different from the
input-generation form of fuzzing in FairFuzz.
Search-based software testing (SBST) [19, 20, 22–24, 29, 31, 32,
42] uses optimization techniques such as hill climbing and genetic
algorithms to generate inputs that optimize some observable fitness
function. These techniques work well when the fitness curve is
smooth with respect to changes in the input, which is not the case
in coverage-based greybox fuzzing.
FairFuzz: Targeting Rare Branches to Rapidly Increase Greybox Fuzz Testing Coverage
REFERENCES
[1] 2016. laf-tintel. https://lafintel.wordpress.com/. (2016). Accessed August 23rd,
2017.
[2] 2016. laf-tintel source. https://gitlab.com/laf-intel/laf-llvm-pass. (2016). Accessed
August 24th, 2017.
[3] 2016. libFuzzer. http://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html. (2016). Accessed August
25th, 2017.
[4] Pedram Amini and Aaron Portnoy. 2012. Sulley.
https://github.com/OpenRCE/sulley. (2012). Accessed August 22nd, 2017.
[5] Abhishek Arya and Cris Neckar. 2012. Fuzzing for Security.
https://blog.chromium.org/2012/04/fuzzing-for-security.html. (2012).
[6] Osbert Bastani, Rahul Sharma, Alex Aiken, and Percy Liang. 2017. Synthesizing
Program Input Grammars. In Proceedings of the 38th ACM SIGPLAN Conference
on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI 2017).
[7] Marcel Böhme. 2016. AFLFast.new. https://groups.google.com/d/msg/afl-users/
1PmKJC-EKZ0/lbzRb8AuAAAJ. (2016). Accessed August 23rd, 2017.
[8] Marcel Böhme, Van-Thuan Pham, Manh-Dung Nguyen, and Abhik Roychoud-
hury. 2017. Directed Greybox Fuzzing. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’17).
[9] Marcel Böhme, Van-Thuan Pham, and Abhik Roychoudhury. 2016. Coverage-
based Greybox Fuzzing As Markov Chain. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’16).
[10] Sergey Bratus, Axel Hansen, and Anna Shubina. 2008. LZfuzz: a fast compression-
based fuzzer for poorly documented protocols. Technical Report. Department of
Computer Science, Darmouth College.
[11] Cristian Cadar, Daniel Dunbar, and Dawson Engler. 2008. KLEE: Unassisted and
Automatic Generation of High-coverage Tests for Complex Systems Programs.
In Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Conference on Operating Systems Design and
Implementation (OSDI’08).
[12] Sang Kil Cha, Maverick Woo, and David Brumley. 2015. Program-Adaptive
Mutational Fuzzing. In Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP ’15).
[13] Chris Evans, Matt Moore, and Tavis Ormandy. 2011. Fuzzing at Scale. https://
security.googleblog.com/2011/08/fuzzing-at-scale.html. (2011). Accessed August
24th, 2017.
[14] Gordon Fraser and Andrea Arcuri. 2011. EvoSuite: Automatic Test Suite Gen-
eration for Object-oriented Software. In Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGSOFT
Symposium and the 13th European Conference on Foundations of Software Engi-
neering (ESEC/FSE ’11).
[15] Vijay Ganesh, Tim Leek, andMartin Rinard. 2009. Taint-based DirectedWhitebox
Fuzzing. In Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Software Engineering
(ICSE ’09).
[16] Patrice Godefroid, Adam Kiezun, and Michael Y. Levin. 2008. Grammar-based
Whitebox Fuzzing. In Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Pro-
gramming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI ’08).
[17] Patrice Godefroid, Nils Klarlund, and Koushik Sen. 2005. DART: Directed Auto-
mated Random Testing. In Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGPLAN Conference on
Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI ’05).
[18] Patrice Godefroid, Hila Peleg, and Rishabh Singh. 2017. Learn&Fuzz: Machine
Learning for Input Fuzzing. CoRR (2017). http://arxiv.org/abs/1701.07232
[19] Mark Grechanik, Chen Fu, and Qing Xie. 2012. Automatically finding perfor-
mance problems with feedback-directed learning software testing. In 2012 34th
International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE). IEEE, 156–166.
[20] Mark Grechanik, Qing Xie, and Chen Fu. 2009. Maintaining and evolving GUI-
directed test scripts. In 2009 IEEE 31st International Conference on Software Engi-
neering. IEEE, 408–418.
[21] Istvan Haller, Asia Slowinska, Matthias Neugschwandtner, and Herbert Bos. 2013.
Dowsing for Overflows: A Guided Fuzzer to Find Buffer Boundary Violations. In
Proceedings of the 22Nd USENIX Conference on Security (SEC’13).
[22] Mark Harman. 2007. The current state and future of search based software
engineering. In 2007 Future of Software Engineering. IEEE Computer Society,
342–357.
[23] Mark Harman and John Clark. 2004. Metrics are fitness functions too. In Software
Metrics, 2004. Proceedings. 10th International Symposium on. IEEE, 58–69.
[24] Mark Harman and Bryan F Jones. 2001. Search-based software engineering.
Information and software Technology 43, 14 (2001), 833–839.
[25] Sam Hocevar. 2007. zzuf. http://caca.zoy.org/wiki/zzuf/. (2007). Accessed August
22nd, 2017.
[26] Christian Holler, Kim Herzig, and Andreas Zeller. 2012. Fuzzing with Code
Fragments. In Presented as part of the 21st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 12).
[27] Matthias Höschele and Andreas Zeller. 2016. Mining Input Grammars from
Dynamic Taints. In Proceedings of the 31st IEEE/ACM International Conference on
Automated Software Engineering (ASE 2016).
[28] Allen D. Householder and Jonathan M. Foote. 2012. Probability-Based Parameter
Selection for Black-Box Fuzz Testing. Technical Report. CarnegieMellon University
Software Engineering Institute.
[29] Bogdan Korel. 1990. Automated software test data generation. IEEE Transactions
on software engineering 16, 8 (1990), 870–879.
[30] Yuekang Li, Bihuan Chen, Mahinthan Chandramohan, Shang-Wei Lin, Yang Liu,
and Alwen Tiu. 2017. Steelix: Program-state Based Binary Fuzzing. In Proceedings
of the 2017 11th Joint Meeting on Foundations of Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE
2017).
[31] Phil McMinn. 2011. Search-Based Software Testing: Past, Present and Future.
In Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Fourth International Conference on Software Test-
ing, Verification and Validation Workshops (ICSTW ’11). IEEE Computer Society,
Washington, DC, USA, 153–163. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSTW.2011.100
[32] Webb Miller and David L. Spooner. 1976. Automatic generation of floating-point
test data. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 2, 3 (1976), 223.
[33] Max Moroz and Kostya Serebryany. 2016. Guided in-process fuzzing of Chrome
components. https://security.googleblog.com/2016/08/guided-in-process-fuzzing-
of-chrome.html. (2016).
[34] Carlos Pacheco and Michael D. Ernst. 2007. Randoop: Feedback-directed Random
Testing for Java. In Companion to the 22nd ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Object-
oriented Programming Systems and Applications Companion (OOPSLA ’07).
[35] Sanjay Rawat, Vivek Jain, Ashish Kumar, Lucian Cojocar, Cristiano Giuffrida,
and Herbert Bos. 2017. VUzzer: Application-aware Evolutionary Fuzzing. In
Proceedings of the 2017 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS
’17).
[36] Jesse Ruderman. 2015. jsfunfuzz. https://github.com/MozillaSecurity/funfuzz/
tree/master/js/jsfunfuzz. (2015).
[37] Koushik Sen and Gul Agha. 2006. CUTE and jCUTE: Concolic Unit Testing
and Explicit Path Model-checking Tools. In Proceedings of the 18th International
Conference on Computer Aided Verification (CAV’06).
[38] Koushik Sen, DarkoMarinov, and Gul Agha. 2005. CUTE: A Concolic Unit Testing
Engine for C. In Proceedings of the 10th European Software Engineering Conference
Held Jointly with 13th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Foundations of
Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE-13).
[39] Nick Stephens, John Grosen, Christopher Salls, Andrew Dutcher, Ruoyu Wang,
Jacopo Corbetta, Yan Shoshitaishvili, Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna.
2016. Driller: Augmenting Fuzzing Through Selective Symbolic Execution. In
Proceedings of the 2016 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS
’16).
[40] Tielei Wang, Tao Wei, Guofei Gu, and Wei Zou. 2010. TaintScope: A Checksum-
Aware Directed Fuzzing Tool for Automatic Software Vulnerability Detection. In
Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP ’10).
[41] Xuejun Yang, Yang Chen, Eric Eide, and John Regehr. 2011. Finding and Un-
derstanding Bugs in C Compilers. In Proceedings of the 32nd ACM SIGPLAN
Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI ’11).
[42] Shin Yoo and Mark Harman. 2007. Pareto efficient multi-objective test case
selection. In Proceedings of the 2007 international symposium on Software testing
and analysis. ACM, 140–150.
[43] Michał Zalewski. 2014. American Fuzzy Lop. http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl.
(2014). Accessed August 18th, 2017.
[44] Michał Zalewski. 2016. FidgetyAFL. https://groups.google.com/d/msg/afl-users/
fOPeb62FZUg/CES5lhznDgAJ. (2016). Accessed August 23rd, 2017.
[45] Michał Zalewski. 2016. Unique crashes as a metric. https://groups.google.com/
d/msg/afl-users/fOPeb62FZUg/LYxgPYheDwAJ. (2016). Accessed August 24th,
2017.
[46] Michał Zalewski. 2017. American Fuzzy Lop Technical Details. http://lcamtuf.
coredump.cx/afl/technical_details.txt. (2017). Accessed August 18th, 2017.
[47] Andreas Zeller and Ralf Hildebrandt. 2002. Simplifying and Isolating Failure-
Inducing Input. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 28, 2 (2002), 183–200.
